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“To see keeping a conversation going as a sufficient aim in 
philosophy, to see wisdom as consisting in the ability to sustain a 
conversation, is to see human beings as generators of new 
descriptions rather than beings one hopes to be able to describe 
accurately”. 
 R.Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature 
1. Introduction 
Ever since R.Rorty published The Linguistic Turn in 1967, 
the study of narrative has acquired new consideration. For 
postmodern philosopher J-F. Lyotard the very advances of 
science are seen “as anything more than a narrative and 
not one that can override all others” (Lyotard, 1984, 16).  
In the last two decades the attention of scholars has 
focused upon the ability of narrative of modelling our 
concepts of legitimacy and reality (Bruner, 2002, 124). The 
dimension of narrative and that of narrating about oneself 
is not only what constitutes our peculiar way of being 
humans, but the privilege means by which we make order 
in our lives and experiences and this also emphasizes the 
therapeutic side of narration. 
Many philosophers have considered the dimension of 
multiple perspectives, but some have also underlined a 
kind of philosophical practical narrative through a relatively 
new professional figure, that of the Philosophische Bereiter 
set zur Mitte der philosophischen Praxis, which Aschen-
bach sees as “a free dialogue, that does not prescribe any 
philosopheme, does not give any philosophical knowledge 
whatsoever; instead it sets thinking in movement in the 
sense of ‘philosophizing’ together with someone” 
(Marquard, 1989, pp.1307). 
Aim of this paper is to reflect on what can be called the 
intermediate territory between psychology and philosophy. 
The former, before being considered as a discipline, is 
seen primarily as the logos for the psychè, which is at the 
same time a thèrapeia for the psychè, or, in other words, 
how to take care of one’s soul by means of words (Hillman, 
1984, 46).  
It is a reflection in the field of philosophy where this is 
seen strictly linked to human existence assuming that 
“living a human life is a philosophical endeavour. Every 
thought we have, every decision we make, and every act 
we perform is based upon philosophical assumptions” 
(Lakoff & Johnson, 1999, 9).  
In this sense a therapeutic relationship is one which 
does not necessarily or exclusively occur between a 
“therapist” and his/her “client”; it is dialogical, in the sense 
of being a narrative capable of transforming reality, of 
creating new situations. It is a human relationship made up 
of concrete interactions between people that take part in it, 
with an open emphatic disposition, and where, as 
Wittgenstein says, words are actions (Wittgenstein 1953, 
546; 1977, 90) bound to produce changes.  
In this sense thèrapeia is a being together in a place, in 
a relationship, giving to others and to oneself time to 
speak, reflect, understand, ask and tell, time to make 
sense out of experiences; open to others, willing to listen 
to them with empathy and where, as with the ancient 
Greeks, words may function as a Pharmakon.  
Here it will be sought to explore new narrative-philoso-
phical metaphors on the basis of Peirce’s statement that: 
“We believe to a proposition on which basis we are willing 
to act” (Peirce, 1992, 112).  
This is very similar to what Gorgias says in his Enco-
mium of Helen (12): “A speech that has persuaded a mind, 
makes the mind that has persuaded to believe in the 
words and to consent in deeds”. 
2. Searching for mythologies 
The ancient Greek believed every person’s identity could 
be expressed by the events, i.e. the story or stories, the 
person had taken part in during the course of the life. 
When Ulysses at the court of the king of the Pheaces sits 
in disguise and listens to the blind bard who sings a story 
about “Deeds of Heroes, a story whose fame goes up to 
the sky” (Odyssey, VIII, vv. 72-74), for the first time he 
listens to someone telling about the War of Troy, about 
himself and his actions, and, as Homer says, in that 
precise time Ulysses cries. Hannah Arendt says at this 
regard: “Never before had he cried when the events he 
now listens to had really happened. Only listening to the 
tale he gets the full gist of them”
 
(Arendt, 1987, 221).  
Always for the ancient Greeks as the gods themselves 
did take part in these human stories, they were equal to 
myths, and a person’s biography became his/her mythol-
ogy (Hillman, 1984, p. 106).  
Later the same Greeks identified the concept of intro-
spection or self-knowledge with the activity of putting in 
order or reviewing carefully these stories (Hillman, 1984, p. 
107). 
Myths have accompanied the history of mankind from its 
dawn, “Myth” is a tale, novel, a speech, whose “function is 
to express in a discursive way an ontological simulta-
neousness, it simulates a genesis” (Birrel, 1993, 34). 
Mythology is a “modality of signification”, but also an 
“system of communication, a form and a meaning”, a “kind 
of discourse” (Barthes, 1972, 114, 127). 
The concept of myth and that of mythology in hinted to in 
some works of Wittgenstein in two fields strictly related 
with the present paper: with reference to Freudian 
psychoanalysis and to his own philosophical activity.  
In his Lectures Wittgenstein refers to Freud’s psycho-
analysis as “a powerful mythology” and moreover, as a 
“way of behaving” and “a way of thinking” (Wittgenstein, 
1966, 52). He says in fact: “ The general result of analysis 
is that it provides explanations which many people are 
inclined to accept … it make easier for them follow certain 
routes: certain ways of behaving and of thinking becomes 
natural. They have abandoned a way of thinking and have 
adopted a new one” (Wittgenstein, 1966, 43). Wittgenstein 
was keen on reading Freud’s works because he believed 
Freud was “a psychologist who had something to say” 




(Monk, 1990, 357) and who “Having read the ancient myth 
of Oedipus”, had not given a scientific explanation of the 
same, “but simply had proposed a new myth” (Wittgestein, 
1966, 51), a new language or a new narrative. 
Wittgenstein considered himself “a disciple of Freud” 
(Monk, 1990, 357) but opposed Freud’s claim that his 
method was scientific. “Freud is constantly claiming to be 
scientific, but what he gives is only a speculation, 
something prior even to the formation of an hypothesis” 
(Wittgenstein, 1966, 44). 
For how could Freud be scientific if the same discipline 
he was engaged into was not a scientific one? “Psychol-
ogy is often called the science of mental phenomena … 
this is a bit suspect as if we said: it stands to physics as 
the science of physical phenomena … By the science of 
mental phenomena we mean … the science which deals 
with thinking, judging, wishing, wondering. When psy-
chologists draw their correlations they do so by observing 
individuals … So, where is the science of mental phenom-
ena?” (Monk, 1990, 496). 
But when Freud’s method was considered as a myth it 
has the peculiar “attraction which mythological explanation 
have, …which say this is all a repetition of something 
which has happened before” (Wittgenstein, 1966, 43), and 
through this mythological explanation many people get 
benefits and advantages because “certain things seem 
much clearer and easier for them” (Wittgenstein, 1966, 
43). 
In one of his Bemerkungen W. adds that “in a way 
having oneself psychoanalyzed is like eating from the tree 
of knowledge. Knowledge acquired set us new ethical 
problems but contributes nothing to their solution” 
(Wittgenstein, 1977, 71). Probably psychoanalysis does 
not help to solve problems, but in the same way as his own 
philosophical method it may help to “propose or invent new 
ways to look ” (Monk, 1990, 496) at the problems.  
In his Lectures he writes: “If you are led by psychoanaly-
sis to say that you really thought so and so, or really your 
motive was so and so, this is not a matter of discovery, but 
of persuasion” (Wittgenstein, 1966, 27) and also: “One 
thinks of certain results of psychoanalysis as a discovery 
… as apart from something persuaded by a psycho-
analyst” (Wittgenstein, 1966, 27). A bit further he adds 
“What I do is also persuasion”, because “very often I draw 
your attention on certain differences” (Wittgenstein, 1966, 
28). Also he, as Freud, made use of myths, because “my 
symbolic description was really a mythological description” 
(Wittgenstein, 1953, 221). 
It is in psychoanalysis, as new language, line of thinking, 
way of seeing the positive side of it, non in his presup-
posed scientific nature, that Wittgenstein finds common 
roots, because as far as human beings are concerned, he 
thought that one had to choose the correct myths, capable 
of giving “a perspicuous representation” of the “processes”. 
“One of the principal origin of our incomprehension” he 
says “is the fact that we do not see clearly the use of our 
words. Our grammar lacks perspicuity. A perspicuous 
representation make comprehension possible, which 
means that we see connections” (Wittgenstein, 1953, 122). 
So Freud’s explanations of dreams is not valuable as a 
science that explains their causes, but rather as the correct 
language to speak about them. With this language Witt-
genstein identified because “is all made up of excellent 
similes” but also “what I invent are new similes” (Monk, 
1990, 357) which, as with those of Freud’s bring someone 
to elaborate “a line of thinking” or to modify the existing 
one, since: “much of what we do is to change our line of 
thinking, much of what I do is to change the line of think-
ing, much of what I do is to persuade others to change 
their line of thinking. Much of what we do is a matter of 
changing line of thinking” (Wittgenstein, 1966, 30). 
We have assumed so far that Wittgenstein’s way of 
philosophizing and psychoanalysis “required analogous 
talents” to persuade they both have to make use of the 
same instruments by which a conversation becomes 
persuasion as a narrative (a convincing explanation or a 
good story) and for its use of good or correct rethoric 
means. Wittgenstein says that his aim in philosophy was to 
“to give the morphology of the use of one expression. To 
show uses you had never dreamt before” (Monk, 1990, 
496). This he does after having introduced the reader with 
the notion of language-game “the whole (of which) 
consisting of language and the actions into which it is 
woven” (Wittgenstein, 1953, 7). But he also says that a 
language-game is “part of a frame on whose basis our 
language operates” (Wittgenstein, 1953, 240). The 
concept of frame was extensively used by G. Bateson 
since 1954 or better, the action of reframing existing 
language games behaviours, or beliefs in the clients and 
their families lies at the heart of the systemic therapeutic 
method or of that of various brief therapies. But framing or 
reframing presupposes in the therapist linguistic-rethorical 
skills similar to those already mentioned. The concept of 
frame and that of language-game are similar, so we can 
presuppose that the persuasive or reframing activity, 
simply means as Wittgenstein notes abandoning old 
games to adopt new ones “But how can the new game 
made the old one seem obsolete? We now see something 
different and cannot continue to play ingenuously as 
before” (Wittgenstein, 1956, 132). To “see” means to 
“perceive”, “But” says Bateson, “Perception operates only 
upon difference. All receipt of information is necessarily the 
receipt of news of difference” (Bateson, 1979, 29).  
This “something different” is what Bateson calls news of 
difference “It takes at least two something to produce a 
difference. To produce news of difference, i.e. information, 
there must be two entities (real or imagined) such that the 
difference between them can be immanent in their mutual 
relationship” (Bateson, 1979, 68). 
In classical therapeutic conversation there is always a 
structure which presupposes the notion of power and 
control beside a conditioning “value laden” which starts 
from the very definitions of the roles indicate by the terms 
“therapist” “patient”, “client”. But we have started by saying 
that the meaning by which to understand the term 
“therapy” was that of a logos for the psychè, how to take 
care of the psychè by means of words, or through a 
conversational praxis apt to produce changes, where the 
emphasis is on language, people and their problems are 
seen as problems in language whose aim is to let emerge 
those news of difference as the flow of conversation goes 
on or as the language games of people involved become 
clear. The language games which condition our behaviour 
as “a ‘picture’ that “held us captive. And we could not get 
outside it, for it lay in our language” (Wittgenstein, 1953, 
115). 
But this ‘image’ can be the too much structured framed, 
vertical and asymmetrical of classical therapy, while in real 
conversations the flow is horizontal, polyphonic, unpredict-
able and unforeseen: a narrative which co-constructs itself 
in the dialogue, set thinking in movement, makes news of 
difference be perceived.  




And this sometimes brings forth a change in the line of 
thinking, in the way of seeing, can teach “how to pass from 
a piece of disguise nonsense to something that is patent 
nonsense” (Wittgenstein, 1953, 464), can make changes 
through words. 
All this, if it may be of any therapeutic value, still pertains 
to philosophical reflection and practice. 
As, with Hillman “A successful therapy is in the end, a 
collaboration among narrations, a revision of the story in a 
more clever, more imaginative plot, which implies, 
however, the sense of the mythos in every part of it” 
(Hillman, 1983, 21). 
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